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The Antitrust Liability of Comsat in its Role as
Representative to Intelsat
I. Introduction
In 1962, the United States passed the Communications Satellite
Act (CSA), creating Comsat, a corporation that represents the
United States in the international arena.' A global satellite system
was developed through the progress of the Intelsat system. In 1965,
when Intelsat launched its first satellite, Early Bird, there were eleven
member nations. By 1982, Intelsat controlled two-thirds of the
world's international telecommunications and most international tel-
evision. 2 Today, Intelsat consists of 121 member nations,3 operates
15 satellites and provides satellite services to 180 countries. 4
Under international agreements, Intelsat has enjoyed a monop-
oly in international satellite communications. 5 Participating nations
designate representatives to serve in Intelsat. Satellite and commu-
nication companies, supplying telephone, data and television serv-
ices, transmit and receive material from Intelsat satellites and charge
their customers for these services. In the United States, access to
Intelsat is controlled by Comsat.
The potential introduction of private competitive services ig-
nited a fear in Intelsat signatories that private competitors would de-
prive member governments of Intelsat fees and undermine the entire
I The Communications Satellite Act, or the CSA, is found in 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-748
(1988). Comsat provides services for all communications coming through the Intelsat sys-
tem which originate or terminate in the United States. The Congressional debates that
preceded the passage of the CSA were controversial but not within the scope of this Note.
For a discussion of this controversy, see WALTER A. McDOUGALL, THE HEAVENS AND THE
EARTH 354, 356 (1986). For a discussion of the legal background of the CSA see Jefferson
C. Glassie, Analysis of the Legal Authority for Establishment of Private International Communications
Satellite Systems, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 355, 361-68 (1984); Victor G. Rosen-
blum, Regulation in Orbit: Administrative Aspects of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 58
Nw. U.L. REV. 216, 216-19 (1963). See generally HarveyJ. Levin, Organization and Control of
Communications Satellites, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 315 (1965) (discussing the original version of
the CSA).
2 47 Fed. Reg. 40226-02 (1982).
3 The Selection of Irving Goldstein to be the U.S. Candidate for Director General of
the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, 137 CONG. REC. S 15092-02,
October 23, 1991. This includes the Confederation of Soviet States which joined Intelsat
in July of 1991.
4 Id.
5 Until the development of the Pan American Satellite, the satellite at issue in this
case, Intelsat consisted of only government-controlled satellite systems.
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Intelsat system. Despite this fear, Article XIV of the Intelsat Agree-
ment lists procedures that allow member nations to establish sepa-
rate, non-Intelsat communications satellite systems. Comsat handles
the consultations for U.S. companies wishing to establish a competi-
tive satellite system.
The Reagan Administration endorsed the idea of limited compe-
tition with Intelsat. Yet, even with the Reagan endorsement, the
plaintiff in Alpha Lyracom Space Communications v. Communications Satel-
lite Corp. ,6 suffered a delay of over three years before receiving final
launch approval from the FCC and permission from Intelsat for a
competitive satellite system. 7
In Alpha Lyracom, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit considered the issue of whether antitrust liability should
extend to Comsat in its role as representative of the United States to
Intelsat.8 The Second Circuit held that Comsat is immune from anti-
trust liability when it acts as the U.S. representative to Intelsat.9 This
Note examines the court's reasoning in Alpha Lyracom and its implica-
tions for future communications and antitrust policy. It sketches the
history of Comsat and Intelsat and highlights potential antitrust
problems for both Comsat and Intelsat. The Note concludes that the
Second Circuit's decision is consistent with both the CSA and Intel-
sat Agreements as well as the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Note fur-
ther concludes that as a practical matter, the Alpha Lyracom decision
will hinder the entry of U.S. corporations into the international satel-
lite market, but will not prohibit this entry outright.
II. Statement of the Case
Reynold Anselmo, doing business as Alpha Lyracom, owned and
operated "the first international commercial communications satel-
lite outside" Intelsat.' 0 Alpha Lyracom operated its satellite commu-
nications through a space communications satellite called PanAmSat,
or PAS I, launched in 1988."1 Alpha Lyracom alleged that rather
than conducting Article XIV(d) Intelsat consultations on PAS I's be-
half, Comsat engaged in anticompetitive conduct to thwart PAS I's
6 946 F.2d 168 (2d Cir. 1991).
7 See infra notes 84-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of Presidential De-
termination No. 85-2 and the Foreign Labor Relations Act.
8 Alpha Lyracom 1, 946 F.2d at 169.
9 Id.
10 Alpha Lyracom is a sole proprietorship which in turn does business as Pan Ameri-
can Satellite, or PAS. Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Communications Satellite
Corp., 1990 WL 135637, 1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1990), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1174 (1992).
Mr. Anselmo founded Pan American Satellite in Stamford, Connecticut. In 1989, he
bought and launched the first privately owned communications satellite over the Atlantic
for a cost of $85 million. Today, his satellite is booked solid, offering rates about one-half
of those offered by Intelsat. Edmund L. Andrews, New Competition in the Sky, and Just in Time
for the War, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1991, at § 3, 12.
11 Alpha Lyracom 11, 1990 WL 135637, at 1.
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successful entry into both the domestic and the international satellite
markets. 12
In September of 1985, the FCC preliminarily approved Alpha
Lyracom's application to construct and operate PAS 1.13 At that
time, Comsat, in its capacity as Intelsat signatory, entered into Arti-
cle XIV(d) consultations for PAS I. 14 In September 1987, following
a favorable resolution by the Assembly of Parties, 15 Alpha Lyracom
received final FCC approval to launch PAS I for communication
transmissions between the United States and Peru.16 Alpha Lyracom
launched the satellite in June of 1988.17
In 1988, the Board of Governors of Intelsat approved the use of
PAS I for domestic communications in the United Kingdom and
Chile.' 8 By 1989, Comsat had entered into Article XIV(d) consulta-
tions with the Assembly of Parties for the approval of Alpha
Lyracom's services for international communications. 19 These con-
sultations were completed by the end of 1989 and permission was
granted to Alpha Lyracom to use PAS I in the approved markets.20
A. The District Court Decision
Alpha Lyracom contended that Comsat conspired with Intelsat
and other representatives to delay PAS I's entry into the interna-
tional satellite market. 21 Alpha Lyracom charged Comsat, acting to-
gether with Intelsat, with passing an anticompetitive resolution.
This resolution required Intelsat to boycott competing systems, in
effect delaying Article XIV(c) and Article XIV(d) consultations on
PAS I's behalf.22 Comsat also allegedly purchased excess satellite
capacity and priced satellite telecommunications services without re-
gard to costs. This action reduced the number of satellite spaces
open to competing systems (such as PAS I). Alpha Lyracom's com-
plaint also alleged that Comsat had entered into an agreement with
various European signatories to provide "end-to-end" service, to set
prices without regard to cost, and to form separate joint ventures
12 Id. at 5.
13 Id. PAS I is a subregional Western Hemisphere satellite system. Id.
14 Id.
15 The Assembly of Parties consists of the member-nations to Intelsat. See infra note
94 and accompanying text.
16 Alpha Lyracom 11, 1990 WL 135637, at 5.
17 Id.
18 Id. The United Kingdom and Chile requested the services of Alpha Lyracom for
domestic communications. The Board of Governors approved the requests following Arti-
cle XIV(d) consultations. Id.
19 Id. Alpha Lyracom received approval to provide international services included
the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, and several Central and South American coun-
tries. Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 6.
22 Id.
19921 549
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
with several South American signatories.23 Alpha Lyracom con-
tended that Comsat, while responsible for conducting Article XIV(d)
consultations on PAS I's behalf, actually prevented PAS I's entry into
the world's satellite markets2 4 Comsat allegedly filed a sham opposi-
tion to Anselmo's application to obtain a federal income tax deferral
for the development, purchase, and launch of a telecommunications
satellite, refused to do business with PAS I, and told potential cus-
tomers that PAS I would be unable to obtain timely adequate satel-
lite capacity or to complete Intelsat consultations. 25 Alpha Lyracom
contended that this anticompetitive conduct violated sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 26
Comsat claimed that it was immune from suit by reason of the
International Organizations Immunities Act 27 (IOIA) and the Head-
quarters Agreement of the Definitive Agreement of Intelsat.28 Alpha
Lyracom, however, believed that section 701 (c) of the CSA reflected
the clear intention of Congress to submit Comsat to antitrust liabil-
ity29 and sought both damages and injunctive relief for antitrust vio-
lations. Comsat moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a
claim, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to join a neces-
sary and indispensable party.30 The district court granted Comsat's
motion and dismissed the complaint.3 1
Alpha Lyracom's argument that Congress, on behalf of Comsat,
waived Comsat's immunity from antitrust laws in section 701(c) of
the CSA was not accepted. 32 The court held that Comsat had immu-
nity from antitrust suits under paragraph sixteen of the Headquar-
ters Agreement33 and never reached the antitrust complaints. The
court accepted the defendant's argument that section 701(c) con-
cerns the ownership of large blocks of Comsat stock by communica-
tions common carriers such as AT&T and does not relate to
Comsat's actions as representative to Intelsat.3 4 Furthermore, Intel-
sat was considered a "necessary" party under Rule 19(a) because the
23 Id. at 5.
24 Id. Most of the allegations concerned the restraint of trade and monopolization in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. See infra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
27 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1988 and Supp. 1 1989) [hereinafter 1O1A]. See infra note 67 and
accompanying text.
28 Alpha Lyracom 11, 1990 WL 135637, at 6.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1. The indispensable party was Intelsat. The motion was filed under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l), (6), and (7). Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 7. Section 701(c) of the CSA provides that Comsat "shall be consistent with
the antitrust laws." 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-748. Comsat was granted immunity under the Head-
quarters Agreement of Intelsat.
33 Alpha Lyracom 11, 1990 WL 135637, at 8.




"lion's share" of Alpha Lyracom's allegations concerned action be-
tween Comsat and Intelsat's member nations. 35 Alpha Lyracom ap-
pealed to the Second Circuit.3 6
B. The Second Circuit Decision
The Second Circuit upheld the district court's decision that
Comsat was entitled to statutory immunity from antitrust liability for
actions taken in its capacity as U.S. representative to Intelsat. 37 The
court further held that the "antitrust consistency clause" of the CSA
applied only to Comsat's activities as a common carrier and not as an
Intelsat representative.3 8 By examining the Sherman Antitrust Act
and the CSA, the court concluded that Congress did not intend for
Comsat to face antitrust liability in its capacity as a representative to
Intelsat.3 9
The court held that the district court's dismissal of the claims
against Comsat on the ground of immunity from antitrust liability
was proper.40 The Second Circuit, however, remanded the case to
the district court because Alpha Lyracom was entitled to an opportu-
nity to amend its complaint to replead allegations that might not en-
counter an immunity defense. 41
III. Background
A. Intelsat and Comsat
In 1961, the United Nations passed a resolution calling for inter-
national cooperation in developing a global communications system
in light of Soviet and American experimentation into space satellites
and the use of satellite technology in global communications. 42 The
resolution expressed the desire of U.N. member-nations that "com-
munication by means of satellite should be available to the nations of
the world.., on a global and non-discriminatory basis."' 43 This ob-
jective was to prevent technologically superior nations from launch-
ing satellites into the limited number of available orbits, thereby
creating a monopoly on international satellite communications.
By enacting the CSA, Congress implemented the national policy
goal of establishing "in conjunction and in cooperation with other
35 Id. at 9. Moreover, meaningful injunctive relief could not be granted without the
presence of Intelsat in the suit. Id.
36 Alpha Lyracom 1, 946 F.2d at 168.
37 Id. at 176.
38 Id. at 174-75.
39 Id. at 174.
40 Id. at 173-75.
41 Id. at 176.
42 U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., 1085 plen. mtg., Supp. No. 17, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1962).
43 Alpha Lyracom 11, 1990 WL 135637, at 7.
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countries, as expeditiously as practicable a commercial communica-
tions satellite system." '4 4 Rather than relying solely on governmental
efforts, Congress sought to "provide for the widest possible partici-
pation by private enterprise."'45 Congress provided for private par-
ticipation by creating Comsat, a publicly held corporation.46 Comsat
was to act "subject to appropriate governmental regulation ... [as
the] United States participa[nt] in the global system." 47 Under the
CSA, Comsat assumed responsibility for planning, constructing, and
operating the satellite system, either by itself or with foreign
governments.48
Comsat is subject to Presidential supervision "to assure [that
Comsat's relations with foreign governments and international orga-
nizations] shall be consistent with the national interest and foreign
policy of the United States."'49 The CSA imposes a duty on Comsat
to comply with all the provisions of Chapter 47 of the United States
Code.50 The CSA also authorizes a district court to enjoin Comsat
from taking any action or adopting any practices or policies inconsis-
tent with "the policy and purposes declared in section 701" of the
CSA. 5 1 Section 701(c) declares the general intent of Congress to
44 47 U.S.C. § 701(a). The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 embodies Con-
gress' policy goals on the establishment of an international satellite system, among them
the communication needs of the United States and contributing to world peace and under-
standing. Id. Although Congress initially vested in Comsat the responsibility of establish-
ing the communications satellite system, in 1964, Intelsat assumed ownership of the
system. Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Communications Sat-
ellite System, Aug. 20 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1705, 54 U.N.T.S. 26. Comsat remains the sole
U.S. member of Intelsat and manager of the system. See generally ITT World Communica-
tions, Inc. v. FCC, 725 F.2d 732, 736-37, n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Although not formally a
treaty as Congressional approval preceded formation of the agreement, the Intelsat agree-
ment is a Congressional-Executive agreement, which normally is considered to have the
full force of a treaty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. e (1986) ("[The] prevailing view is that the Congressional-Exec-
utive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance."); B.
Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 598-602 (1912) (stating that a Congres-
sional-Executive agreement is a "treaty" under statute conferring appellate jurisdiction).
45 47 U.S.C. § 701(c).
46 Id. § 731.
47 Id. § 701(c).
48 Id. § 735(a)(1), (3).
49 Id. § 721(a)(4).
50 Id. § 743(c).
51 Id. § 743(a). Section 701 provides:
(a) Policy
The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to
establish, in conjunction and in cooperation with other countries, as
expeditiously as practicable a commercial communications satellite
system, as part of an improved global communications network, which
will be responsive to public needs and national objectives, which will
serve the communication needs of the United States and other coun-
tries, and which will contribute to world peace and understanding.
(b) Availability of telecommunication services
The new and expanded telecommunication services are to be
made available as promptly as possible and are to be extended to pro-
vide global coverage at the earliest practicable date. In effectuating
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foster competition in the operation of satellite networks. Section
701(c) concludes with the "antitrust consistency clause" which pro-
vides as follows: "[T]he activities of the corporation created under
this chapter and of the persons or companies participating in the
ownership of the corporation shall be consistent with the Federal an-
titrust laws." 52
Today Intelsat has 121 member nations who collectively main-
tain and operate an international network of telecommunications
satellites.53 Intelsat provides international telecommunications serv-
ices to more than 170 countries, territories and dependencies. Intel-
sat further provides domestic telecommunications services to over
thirty countries. 54 In 1971, the member nations of Intelsat executed
two agreements formalizing the ground rules for Intelsat's control
this program, care and attention will be directed toward providing
such services to economically less developed countries and areas as
well as those more highly developed, toward efficient and economical
use of the electromagnetic frequency spectrum, and toward the reflec-
tion of the benefits of this new technology in both quality of services
and charges for such services.
(c) Private enterprise; access; competition
In order to facilitate this development and to provide for the wid-
est possible participation by private enterprise, United States partici-
pation in the global system shall be in the form of a private
corporation, subject to appropriate governmental regulation. It is the
intent of Congress that all authorized users shall have nondiscrimina-
tory access to the system; that maximum competition be maintained
in the provision of equipment and services utilized by the system; that
the corporation created under this chapter be so organized and oper-
ated as to maintain and strengthen competition in the provision of
communications services to the public; and that the activities of the
corporation created under this chapter and of the persons or compa-
nies participating in the ownership of the corporation shall be consis-
tent with the Federal antitrust laws.
(d) Domestic use; additional systems
It is not the intent of Congress by this chapter to preclude the use
of the communications satellite system for domestic communication
services where consistent with the provisions of this chapter nor to
preclude the creation of additional communications satellite systems,
if required to meet unique governmental needs or if otherwise re-
quired in the national interest.
Id. § 701.
52 Id. § 701 (c).
53 The United States and ten other nations entered into an interim executive agree-
ment that created the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat).
Intelsat was established by an Executive Agreement signed by the United States and 10
other nations in order to promote global telecommunications. See Agreement Establishing
Interim Arrangements for a Global Communications Satellite System, Aug. 20, 1964, 15
U.S.T. 1705, 54 U.N.T.S. 26.
54 International agreements prescribe the functions and authority of Intelsat, as well
as the relations between the member nations. International executive agreements, such as
Intelsat, to which the United States is a party constitute the law of the nation. Weinburger
v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 31 (1982); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 677 (1981).
These international executive agreements are subject to the same treatment as treaties of
the United States and are subject to the same rules of construction. United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 223-24, 227-30 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-32
(1937).
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and management of the international satellite operations and sup-
port: the Definitive Agreement and the Operating Agreement. 55
The Definitive Agreement was signed by the government of each
member nation and the Operating Agreement was signed by the sig-
natory/representative of each member nation. 56
The Definitive Agreement established a three-tiered organiza-
tional structure: the Assembly of Parties, the Meeting of Signatories,
and the Board of Governors. 57 The Assembly of Parties provides
one seat for each member nation and convenes once every two years
to consider aspects of Intelsat that affect nations as sovereigns. 58
Most member nations have designated a government agency as their
representative to the Meeting of Signatories. Each representative
has one vote at the annual meeting. As in normal corporate law, a
majority of representatives must be present to constitute a quo-
rum.5 9 The Board of Governors is composed of twenty-nine persons
representing 103 signatories and is responsible for the day-to-day
operation of Intelsat. 60
Although Intelsat was created to form a global telecommunica-
tions network, it maintains procedures for member nations to estab-
lish separate, non-Intelsat, international or domestic
communications satellite systems. 6' In particular, an applicant for a
separate satellite system providing international service must engage
in "consultations" with the Assembly of Parties and the Board of
55 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organiza-
tion "INTELSAT," opened for signature Aug. 20, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 909 [hereinafter Definitive
Agreement]; Operating Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Sat-
ellite Organization "INTELSAT," opened for signature Aug. 20, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 946 [herein-
after Operating Agreement].
56 Comsat signed the Operating Agreement for the United States.
57 Definitive Agreement, supra note 55, art. Ill(a), 10 I.L.M. at 911.
58 The Preamble to the Definitive Agreement expresses the commitment of each
party to "the aim of achieving a single global commercial telecommunications satellite
system as part of an improved global telecommunications network ... which will contrib-
ute to world peace and understanding." Definitive Agreement, supra note 55, Preamble,
10 I.L.M. at 909-10. The Definitive Agreement entrusts the carrying out of this goal to
Intelsat. Definitive Agreement, supra note 55, art. 11(a), 10 I.L.M. at 911.
59 Id.
60 The United States has designated the State Department as its representative to the
Assembly of Parties and Comsat as its signatory and representative to the Meeting of
Signatories.
61 These procedures are called the "consultation" procedures and are found in arti-
cle XIV Definitive Agreement. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. Together the
Definitive and Operating Agreements give the Assembly of Parties, the Meeting of Signa-
tories, and the Board of Governors virtually plenary authority to set rates for the use of
Intelsat satellites. Definitive Agreement, supra note 55, art. V(d), 10 I.L.M. at 913, art.
VIII(b)(v)(c), 10 I.L.M. at 916, art. X(a)(viii), 10 I.L.M. at 921; Operating Agreement, supra
note 55, art. 8(a), 10 I.L.M. at 952. The Agreements also allow approval of Intelsat's
purchases of goods and services. Definitive Agreement, supra note 55, art. X(a)(ii), 10
I.L.M. at 921, art. XIII, 10 I.L.M. at 916-17; Operating Agreement, supra note 55, art. 16,
10 I.L.M. at 955. The Agreements also allow approval of proposals to establish interna-
tional and domestic telecommunications satellite systems separate from Intelsat. Defini-
tive Agreement, supra note 55, art. XIV, 10 I.L.M. at 927-28.
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Governors to ensure the technological compatibility of its system
with Intelsat. 62 The "consultations" also exist to guard against the
possibility that the competing system might cause "economic harm"
to Intelsat. 63
"Consultation" procedures distinguish between satellite systems
for domestic services and international public communications serv-
ices. Proposals for domestic service systems are initiated by the na-
tion in which service will be utilized.64 These proposals are subject
to review only for technical compatibility with the Intelsat system.6 5
When a separate system is proposed by a nation for international
communications services under Article XIV(d), the final assessment
of both the technical compatibility and economic impact of the pro-
posed system on Intelsat must be made by the Assembly of Parties.6 6
B. International Organizations Immunities Act
The International Organizations Immunities Act 6 7 (IOIA) con-
fers immunity from every form ofjudicial process upon international
organizations specifically designated by the President. 68 The broad
purpose of the IOIA is to vitalize the status of international organiza-
tions of which the United States is a member and to facilitate their
activities. 69 Since its inception, Intelsat has been designated as an
62 Definitive Agreement, supra note 55, art. XIV(d), 10 I.L.M. at 928.
63 Id.
64 Id. art. XIV(c), 10 I.L.M. at 928.
65 Id. These reviews are held by the Board of Governors and findings are made in the
form of recommendations. Id.
66 Id. art. XIV(d), 10 I.L.M. at 928. Those seeking to provide separate domestic satel-
lite services need "consult" only with the Board of Governors to ensure technical compati-
bility. Id. art. XIV(c), 10 I.L.M. 928.
67 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1988 and Supp. 1 1989).
68 Id.
69 Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831 (D.C. Cal. 1950). The
IOIA provides:
[T]he term "international organization" means a public international organi-
zation in which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under
the authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such participation or mak-
ing an appropriation for such participation, and which shall have been desig-
nated by the President through appropriate Executive order as being entitled
to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided in this sub-
chapter. The President shall be authorized, in the light of the functions per-
formed by any such international organization, by appropriate Executive
order to withhold or withdraw from any such organization or its officers or
employees any of the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided for in
this subchapter (including the amendments made by this subchapter) or to
condition or limit the enjoyment by any such organization or its officers or
employees of any such privilege, exemption, or immunity. The President
shall be authorized, if in his judgement such action should be justified by
reason of the abuse by an international organization or its officers and em-
ployees of the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided in this sub-
chapter or for any other reason, at any time to revoke the designation of any
international organization under this section, whereupon the international
organization in question shall cease to be classed as an international organi-
zation for the purposes of this subchapter. "
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international organization, and as such is entitled to the immunities
under the IOIA.70 The IOIA also provides that foreign officers and
employees of international organizations are immune from suit and
legal process relating to acts performed in their official capacity. 7' In
addition, the IOIA states that "the archives of international organiza-
tions shall be inviolable."' 72
C. Headquarters Agreement
In 1976, pursuant to the directive of Article XV of the Definitive
Agreement, the United States entered into the Headquarters Agree-
ment. 73 The Headquarters Agreement includes an immunity provi-
sion central to Alpha Lyracom's claims. 74 Paragraph sixteen of the
Headquarters Agreement provides that "[tihe officers and employ-
ees of Intelsat, representatives of the Parties and of the Signatories
... shall be immune from suit and legal process relating to acts per-
formed by them in their official capacity and falling within their
functions .... ,,75
After the creation of Intelsat, the U.S. government, particularly
the Executive Branch, exercised considerable authority under the
CSA to oversee and regulate Comsat's management and operation
of the system and its relations with foreign governments. 76 Execu-
tive Order No. 12,046 dictates that "[w]ith respect to telecommuni-
cations, the Secretary of State shall exercise primary authority for the
conduct of foreign policy, including the determination of United
States positions and the conduct of United States participation in ne-
gotiations with foreign governments and international bodies."
77
The instructional process through which the Secretary directs Com-
sat's participation in Intelsat is formalized in written procedures. In
22 U.S.C. § 288.
70 Executive Order No. 11,966, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1978) (App. H). This Executive Order
was signed by President Ford in 1977 and is the latest designation of Intelsat as an interna-
tional organization. Id.
71 22 U.S.C. § 288d(b).
72 Id. § 288a(c).
73 Article XV of the Definitive Agreement requires each member nation to grant ap-
propriate privileges, exemptions and immunities to Intelsat, to the member nations (Par-
ties) and their representatives, and to the signatories and representatives of Signatories,
relating to their conduct in carrying out their functions and duties. Definitive Agreement,
supra note 55, art. XV, 10 I.L.M. at 929.
74 The immunities provision is in paragraph 16 of the Headquarters Agreement. See
infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
75 International Telecommunications Convention, opened for signature Jan. 1, 1975, 14
I.L.M. 706, 714 [hereinafter Headquarters Agreement]. The United States signed the
Headquarters Agreement on April 7, 1976.
76 This oversight included designating satellite management entities. 47 U.S.C.
§§ 721, 732-33, 742.
77 43 Fed. Reg. 13,349, 13,354 (1978). Executive Order No. 12,046 was made pursu-




particular, the Secretary will "instruct[] [Comsat] in its role as the
designated United States representative to [Intelsat]" 78 and "direct
the foreign relations of the United States with respect to actions
under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962.''79 The proce-
dures recognize that as U.S. representative to Intelsat, "Comsat ex-
ercises . . .an important foreign policy function on behalf of the
'.S."80
Both the Definitive and Operating Agreements include provi-
sions that suggest the possible imposition of legal liability against
Intelsat Signatories. 81 Article XV(c) of the Definitive Agreement
provides:
Each party, other than the party in whose territory the headquarters
of Intelsat is located [the United States] shall grant in accordance
with the Protocol referred to in this paragraph, and the Party in
whose territory the headquarters of Intelsat is located [the United
States] shall grant in accordance with the Headquarters Agreement
... the appropriate privileges, exemptions and immunities to Intel-
sat, to its officers, and to those categories of its employees specified
in such Protocol and Headquarters Agreement, to Parties and repre-
sentatives of Parties, to Signatories and representatives of Signato-
ries and to persons participating in arbitration proceedings. In
particular, each Party shall grant to these individuals immunity from
legal process in respect of acts done or words written or spoken in
the exercise of their functions and within the limits of their duties, to
the extent and in the cases to be provided for in the Headquarters
Agreement and Protocol referred to in this paragraph.8 2
The United States, in fulfillment of its obligations under Article
XV(c), provided in paragraph sixteen of the Headquarters Agree-
ment that the "officers and employees of Intelsat, the representatives
of the Parties and of the Signatories ... shall be immune from suit
and legal process relating to acts performed by them in their official
capacity and falling within their functions, except insofar as such im-
munity may be waived by the head of the executive organ of Intelsat
for its officers and employees, [and] by the Parties and Signatories
for their representatives .... -83 Alpha Lyracom addressed the ques-
tion of whether "representatives of the Parties" in the Headquarters
Agreement include the signatories themselves.
78 43 Fed. Reg. at 13,354.
79 Id. See also Procedures for U.S. Government Instruction of the Communications
Satellite Corporation in its Role as U.S. Representative to the Interim Communications
Satellite Commission, 77 F.C.C.2d 564 (1980); 1984 Memorandum of Understanding
Among the Departments of State and Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission.
80 43 Fed. Reg. at 13,354. Before each Intelsat meeting, Comsat must circulate the
agenda of the meeting to State Department officials who are charged with the responsibil-
ity of issuing instructions to Comsat on how to approach the agenda.
81 See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
82 Definitive Agreement, supra note 55, art. XV(c), 10 I.L.M. at 928.
83 Headquarters Agreement, supra note 75, 14 I.L.M. at 714.
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D. Presidential Determination Number 85-2
In 1983, although Intelsat had functioned as the preeminent
global satellite system since 1964, several American companies ap-
plied to the FCC for permission to operate and establish non-Intelsat
international satellite communications systems.8 4 The CSA made
only a passing reference to competing satellites outside the Intelsat
system, authorizing the President to explore the possibility of "a sep-
arate communications satellite system" where "required to meet
unique governmental needs" or where "otherwise required in the
national interest."' 85 In 1984, occasioned by the influx of applica-
tions, President Reagan, acting pursuant to sections 701(d) and
721 (a) of the CSA and his responsibility to determine whether addi-
tional international systems were "required in the national interest",
issued Presidential Determination No. 85-2. The President deter-
mined that it was in "the national interest" to allow the development
of separate non-Intelsat satellite systems.8 6 Nevertheless, in order to
meet the United States obligations under the Definitive Agreement,
the President instructed the United States to consult with Intelsat
before final authorization of any separate system was provided.
8 7
The President further directed the Secretaries of Commerce and
State to style criteria for the FCC which would insure that the United
States met its international obligations.88 The Departments of Com-
merce and State prescribed two criteria that had to be satisfied prior
to final FCC approval and authorization to commence a separate,
non-Intelsat system.89 First, each new system must be restricted to
providing services through the sale or long-term lease of transpon-
ders or space segment capacity for communications not intercon-
nected with public-switched message networks. 90 Second, one or
more foreign authorities are to authorize use of each system and
enter into consultation procedures with the United States Party
under Article XIV(d) of the Definitive Agreement to insure technical
compatibility and to avoid economic harm to Intelsat. 9 1 The FCC,
84 See Application of Orion Satellite Corp., FCC File No. CSS-83-002-P(LA) (filed
Mar. 11, 1983); Application of Pan American Satellite Corp., FCC File No. CSS-84-004-
P(LA) (filed May 31, 1984).
85 47 U.S.C. § 721(a)(6).
86 49 Fed. Reg. 46,987 (1984). Presidential Determination No. 85-2 declared sepa-
rate, non-Intelsat international satellite systems to be "in the national interest." Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Letter from George P. Schultz, Secretary of State, and Malcolm Baldridge, Secre-
tary of Commerce, to Mark S. Fowler, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (Nov. 28, 1984).
90 Id. See infra note 91 for the text of the letter.
91 Id. The text of the letter states that "[the system] be restricted to providing serv-
ices through the sale or long-term lease of transponders or space segment capacity for
communications not interconnected with public-switched message networks" and "one or
more foreign authorities are to authorize use of each system and enter into consultation
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while approving the concept of separate systems, adopted the two
criteria.92
Before the FCC can grant final authorization for a proposed sep-
arate, non-Intelsat system the applicant must first obtain the authori-
zation of each affected foreign country for the use of the system
within that country and enter into Article XIV(d) consultations. 93
Further, the U.S. government must undertake and complete the con-
sultation procedures within Intelsat's Assembly of Parties 94 as re-
quired by Article XIV(d) of the Definitive Agreement.
E. Foreign Relations Authorization Act
In the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FRAA or the Act),
Congress ratified both the procedures set forth in the Definitive
Agreement and the President's accommodations to the competing
interests of Intelsat and United States companies interested in enter-
ing into the telecommunications industry.95 The FRAA, expanding
on section 721 (a)(6) of the CSA, declared it the policy of the United
States to make available, in addition to satellite services utilizing In-
telsat facilities, "any additional such facilities ... found to be in the
national interest." 96 The additional facilities also had to comply with
the Executive Branch conditions established pursuant to the Presi-
dential Determination. 97 Moreover, these additional satellite serv-
ices had to fulfill two criteria - technical feasibility and avoidance of
economic harm as set out in Article XIV(d) of the Definitive Agree-
ment.98 The FRAA also requires compliance with the requirements
set forth in Presidential Determination No. 85-2. 9 9 Further, the Act
stipulated that "one or more foreign authorities have authorized the
use of such system consistent with such conditions" as a precondi-
tion of consultations with Intelsat.100
The FCC released a report regarding the applications for sepa-
rate, non-Intelsat systems on July 25, 1985.101 The FCC Report fol-
lowed the separate systems policy as put forth by the President,
articulated by the Secretaries of State and Commerce and ratified by
procedures with the United States Party under Article XIV(d) of the Intelsat [Definitive]
Agreement to ensure technical compatibility and to avoid significant economic harm." Id.
92 Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, 101
F.C.C.2d 1046 (1985).
93 Id.
94 The Assembly of Parties consists of the member-nations to Intelsat.
95 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986-87, Pub.L. No. 99-93,
§ 146, 99 Stat. 405, 425-26 (1985).
96 Id. § 146(a)(2).
97 Id. § 146(b)(1).
98 Id. § 146(a)(3).
99 Id. § 146(b)(1).
100 Id. § 146(b)(2).
101 In re Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications,
100 F.C.C. 2d 290 (July 1985).
1992]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Congress.' 02 While generally approving alternative systems, the
FCC conditioned the issuance of licenses on successful Article
XIV(d) consultations. Although the FCC noted that separate satel-
lite systems would benefit users of international communications
services, it concluded that "it [is] necessary to impose the Executive
Branch restrictions on the authorization of these systems in order to
meet our international obligations under the Intelsat Agree-
ment."10 3 The FCC Report did not constitute final approval of any
particular separate, non-Intelsat system. The FCC Report expressly
stated that the FCC will not issue a final license for the operation of
any separate, non-Intelsat system "until the United States has com-
pleted coordination of that system with Intelsat pursuant to Article
XIV(d) of the Intelsat Agreement and we have been informed by the
Department of State that the United States has fulfilled its obligation
under Article XIV(d)."' 10 4 Thus, the FCC recognized that the U.S.
support for separate, non-Intelsat systems must proceed within the
Intelsat framework.
F. Sherman Antitrust Act
The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits every contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy "in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States."10 5 The Sherman Act further prohibits monopolizing
"any part of the trade or commerce among the several States."' 0 6
When Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890, it took a very nar-
row view of its power under the Commerce Clause.' 0 7 Subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have permitted the reach of the Sherman
Act to expand along with the broadening notions of congressional
power.10 8 As long as the restraint in question "substantially and ad-
versely affects interstate commerce,"' 0 9 the interstate commerce
nexus required for Sherman Act coverage is established.
The Sherman Act also applies to regulated industries, but in a
convoluted way. Only Congress, expressly or by implication, may
authorize price fixing, and has done so in particular industries or
compelling circumstances. Implied antitrust immunities are disfa-
102 Id.
103 Id. at 5.
104 Id. at 32.
105 15 U.S.C. § 1 (West 1992). Section I provides: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
106 Id. § 2.
107 See H.R. REP. No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1890); Paul E. Slater, Antitrust and
Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw.U.L.REV. 71, 84 (1974).
108 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 201-02 (1974); United States
v. Employing Plasterers' Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital
Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976).
109 Gulf Oil Corp., 419 U.S. at 195.
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vored." 10 Further, exemptions from the antitrust laws are to be
strictly construed. I I The Supreme Court, following the above logic,
has consistently embraced the view that "[r]egulated industries are
not per se exempt from the Sherman Act. '" 112 The antitrust laws
represent a "fundamental national economic policy." 113
The Supreme Court has only authorized implied exemptions to
the antitrust laws for businesses regulated by federal law when and
only when an exemption was needed to make the regulatory act
"work and even then only to the minimum extent necessary." '"t 4 If
Congress did intend to repeal the antitrust laws, that intent gov-
erns.11 5 Even when an industry is substantially regulated, this does
not necessarily evidence an intent to repeal the antitrust laws with
respect to every action taken within the industry."t 6 Intent to repeal
antitrust laws is much clearer when a regulatory agency has been em-
powered to authorize or require the type of conduct under antitrust
challenge. ' 17
IV. Analysis
A. The Communications Satellite Act and Intelsat
The Alpha Lyracom court's decision is consistent with both the
interpretation of the language in the Headquarters Agreement and
the intent of Congress under section 701(c) of the CSA. To allow
Intelsat to function in other legal realms, the United States and other
member-nations accorded Intelsat and its constituent parts immunity
from suit. Article XV(c) of the Definitive Agreement requires the
host nation [the United States] to execute a Headquarters Agree-
ment which would grant the appropriate immunities.
Paragraph sixteen of the Headquarters Agreement requires each
party to grant immunities "to Intelsat .... to Parties and representa-
tives of Parties, to Signatories and representatives of Signatories. ' 18
The plaintiff in Alpha Lyracom argued for a strict interpretation of this
language.' '9 While the phrasing of paragraph sixteen arguably dis-
110 See, e.g., National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kan-
sas City, 452 US. 378, 388-89 (1981); United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,
422 U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975).
1 11 See, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979);
Abbott Lab. v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, Inc., 425 U.S. I, 11 (1976).
112 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456 (1945).
113 Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966). See
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398-99 (1978).
114 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
115 See United States v. National Ass'n. of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 720 (1975).
116 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372-75 (1973); United States
v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 346 (1959).
117 E.g., National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. at 730-34; Gordon v. New York Stock
Exchange, 442 U.S. at 689-90.
S18 Definitive Agreement, supra note 55, art. XV(c), 10 I.L.M. at 929.
119 The plaintiff argued that they sued a party and signatory itself, not its representa-
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tinguishes between "representatives of Parties" and "Signatories,"
its primary significance lies in its explicit direction to immunize "Sig-
natories." The Definitive Agreement directs extension of immunity
"to the extent and in the cases to be provided for in the Headquar-
ters Agreement," thereby leaving the scope of immunity to be de-
cided in the Headquarters Agreement. However, that qualification
does not suggest that the Headquarters Agreement should be under-
stood to exclude signatories entirely from the category receiving
whatever degree of immunity is to be conferred.
Nevertheless, this interpretation seems inconsistent with the lib-
eral construction of antitrust laws and the disfavor of antitrust immu-
nity.' 20 Also, language in the preceding paragraphs applies to
natural persons, creating an argument that paragraph sixteen applies
only to individuals who act as representatives of either parties or sig-
natories, but not the entities themselves. The court dismissed this
logic for three reasons: (1) paragraph sixteen lacks any intention to
shield certain parties from immunity, (2) plaintiff uses Comsat as
"the United States representative," and (3) exposure of Comsat to
liability is inconsistent with the responsibilities Congress entrusted
to Comsat.12 1
One strong reason for reading the Headquarters Agreement to
include signatories in its grant of immunity is the absence of any in-
dication that the odd arrangement which would result from a con-
trary interpretation was intended. Since the parties themselves will
enjoy sovereign immunity, excluding signatories in paragraph six-
teen would extend immunity to the parties, to Intelsat, and to the
individual representatives of the parties, but not to the signatories
themselves, at least not to those signatories like Comsat who are not
themselves member-nations. It places no strain on the phrase "rep-
resentatives of the Parties" to place signatories within that cate-
gory.122 Comsat is "the designated United States representative to"
Intelsat. 123 Furthermore, the court stated "[tihough the ultimate is-
sue is what the drafters of the Headquarters Agreement meant, not
how others regard Comsat, it is not insignificant that Alpha Lyracom
tive. Alpha Lyracom Space Co. v. Communications Satellite Corp., 1990 WL 135637, at 6 (1990).
The district court did not agree with the plaintiff for two reasons: first, the plaintiffs ac-
knowledged that COMSAT was the representative of the United States Party to Intelsat, id.
second the plaintiffs ignored the fact that paragraph 16 "implements the directive of Art.
XV(c) of the Definitive Agreement to the United States to confer 'appropriate privileges
and immunities to Intelsat ... to Parties ... [and] to Signatories [e.g. Comsat] and repre-
sentatives of Signatories' " Id. (citing Definitive Agreement, supra note 55, art. XV(c), 10
I.L.M. at 929).
120 See National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378, 388-89
(1981); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979).
121 Alpha Lyracom Space Communications v. Communications Satellite Corp., 946
F.2d 168, 174 (2d Cir. 1991).
122 Id.
123 Exec. Order No. 12,046, 43 Fed. Reg. 13,349 (1978) (Pres. Jimmy Carter).
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repeatedly characterized Comsat as "the United States
representative." 24
Exposure of Comsat to antitrust liability in its role as U.S. signa-
tory to Intelsat is inconsistent with the responsibilities Congress en-
trusted to Comsat under the CSA. "Congress could not have
intended to require Comsat to participate in Intelsat subject to Exec-
utive Branch directives and, at the same time, have intended that
Comsat proceed at its own antitrust peril in carrying out that official
role." 25  Comsat has to participate in consultations as the U.S.
representative to Intelsat. These consultations determine to what
extent competing, separate, non-Intelsat systems will be allowed to
operate.126 Congress, having created Comsat to wield monopoly
power, did not intend the corporation to face antitrust liability in
deciding, as a member of Intelsat, whether and to what extent to
permit competition.
The decision in Alpha Lyracom is consistent with section 701 (c) of
the CSA. Section 701(c) does not grant Comsat antitrust immunity
explicitly. The "antitrust immunity clause" provides as follows:
In order to facilitate this development and to provide for the widest
possible participation by private enterprise, United States participa-
tion in the global system shall be in the form of a private corpora-
tion, subject to appropriate governmental regulation. It is the intent
of Congress that all authorized users shall have nondiscriminatory
access to the system; that maximum competition be maintained in
the provision of equipment and services utilized by the system; that
the corporation created under this chapter be so organized and op-
erated as to maintain and strengthen competition in the provision of
communications services to the public; and that the activities of the
corporation created under this chapter and of the persons or compa-
nies participating in the ownership of the corporation shall be con-
sistent with the Federal antitrust laws. 127
The antitrust concern of Congress was that once Comsat was
formed common carriers participating in the ownership of Comsat
would use their ownership position for private, anti-competitive pur-
poses.' 28 Thus, the "antitrust consistency clause" of section 701 (c)
of the CSA applies only to Comsat's role as a common carrier and
not to its role as U.S. representative to Intelsat. 129 The list in section
124 Alpha Lyracom, 946 F.2d at 174.
125 Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. Communications Satellite Corp.,
1990 WL 135637, at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1990). See also Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1985) (private parties acting at the
direction of state officials or agencies are entitled to the same state action antitrust immu-
nity that applies to those officials or agencies). See also Cine 42nd St. Theater Corp. v.
Nederlander Organization Inc., 790 F.2d 1032, 1048 (2d Cir. 1986).
126 Definitive Agreement, supra note 55, art. XIV(d), 10 I.L.M. at 928.
127 47 U.S.C. § 701(c).
128 See S.REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1962) (reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2269).
12') Alpha Lyracom, 946 F.2d 168, 174.
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7 01 (c) does not indicate that Comsat's role in Intelsat must conform
to antitrust litigation.' 3 0 Further, Congress was advised by the Jus-
tice Department that "the mere doing of what [Comsat is] permitted
to do under this bill is not itself going to result in an offense against
the Sherman Act."''s
However, these interpretations of the Headquarters Agreement
and the CSA do not avoid the potential problem of anticompetitive
conduct by Comsat in its role as the sole provider of access to the
global satellite system to U.S. communication carriers. If Alpha
Lyracom amends its complaint to allege anticompetitive behavior
against Comsat in its capacity as a common carrier, then Comsat can
not escape liability.
In 1985, Congress passed the International Telecommunica-
tions Satellite Organization Act.' 3 2 The Act states that it is the
United States policy "to foster and support the global commercial
satellite system owned and operated by Intelsat."' 33 Further, the
United States is to support any communications satellite services
"which are found to be in the national interest."' 3 4 The Alpha
Lyracom decision is consistent with the first policy goal. The decision
is also consistent with the "national interest" policy goal. While PAS
I may provide services that are cheaper than Intelsat services, this
fact alone does not make it in the "national interest" for Comsat to
actively lobby Intelsat on PAS I's behalf.
B. The Sherman Antitrust Act
This decision is consistent with the Sherman Antitrust Act. The
Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits "restraint of trade or com-
merce."' 135 While Comsat's role in Intelsat is one that is fraught with
anticompetitive overtones, in the case of Alpha Lyracom Comsat did
not engage in any violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. While
heavily regulated industries are not per se exempt from the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 136 Comsat is exempt from the Sherman Antitrust Act
in its role as signatory to the Intelsat treaty.' 37
Comsat's antitrust immunity as a representative to Intelsat is not
explicitly addressed by paragraph sixteen of the Headquarters
Agreement. However, Congress entrusted certain responsibilities to
130 47 U.S.C. § 701(c).
131 Antitrust Problems of the Space Satellite Communication System: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1962) (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Katzenbach).
132 Pub. L. 99-93, Title I, § 146, Aug. 16, 1985, 99 Stat. 425 (1985).
133 Id. § 146 (a)(l).
134 Id. § 146 (a)(2).
'35 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973). See supra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
136 See supra note 112.




Comsat in section 701 of the CSA. m3 8 For Comsat to function and
make the CSA work, 139 Comsat must be exempted from the antitrust
laws, but only to the minimum extent necessary. Congress author-
ized Comsat as the representative of the United States to Intelsat,
and in so doing granted Comsat the power to conduct "consulta-
tions" under Article XV(d) of the Definitive Agreement.140 The in-
tent to repeal antitrust laws in the case of Comsat's status as the
representative of the United States to Intelsat is clear as Comsat is
empowered by Congress to conduct Article XV(d) "consultations"
with Intelsat.14 1 Therefore, Comsat's actions in representing Alpha
Lyracom in Article XV(d) "consultations" cannot be a violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The Second Circuit held that Comsat may be liable for viola-
tions of the Sherman Antitrust Act in its capacity as a "common car-
rier."' 142  While Comsat is statutorily declared a "common
carrier,"' 143 treating Comsat as a "common carrier" would not re-
lieve Comsat of antitrust liability. Section 701(c) would apply to
Comsat as a "common carrier."1 44 Even though section 701 (c) of the
CSA requires that the activities of Comsat "be consistent with the
Federal antitrust laws," 145 federal antitrust laws, specifically the
Sherman Antitrust Act, provide that Congress can repeal antitrust
laws when it empowers Comsat with the authority to conduct the
type of activity under antitrust challenge. 146 In this case, Comsat is
authorized to conduct Article XV(d) "consultations" with Intelsat,
but in its role as a "common carrier" Comsat has similar authority.
The Second Circuit ruled in Alpha Lyracom that Comsat would be lia-
ble in its role as a "common carrier", but for the above reasons it is
doubtful that this would be the correct result on remand.
138 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
139 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
140 47 U.S.C. § 701(a)-(d).
141 See supra note 117.
142 Alpha Lyracom Space Communications Co. v. Communications Satellite Corp.,
946 F.2d 168, 175-76 (2d Cir. 1991).
143 47 U.S.C. § 741. Section 741 states:
The corporation shall be deemed to be a common carrier within the meaning
of section 3(h) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended [47 U.S.C.
§ 153(h) (1988)], and as such shall be fully subject to the provisions of title II
[47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1988)] and title III [47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (1988)] of
that Act. The provision of satellite terminal station facilities by one commu-
nication common carrier to one or more other communications common car-
riers shall be deemed to be a common carrier activity fully subject to the
Communications Act [47 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (1988)]. Whenever the applica-
tion of the provisions of this chapter shall be inconsistent with the applica-
tion of the provisions of the Communications Act, the provisions of this
chapter shall govern. Id.
144 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
145 47 U.S.C. § 701(c).
146 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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V. Conclusion
The Alpha Lyracom holding that Comsat's activities as representa-
tive to Intelsat are exempt from antitrust considerations is consistent
with the goal of Intelsat and the fear that the creation of private
transatlantic satellite systems would undermine the objective of a
single global system which would promote world peace. 14 7 In addi-
tion, if traffic was diverted from Intelsat, revenues would decrease
and costs would increase creating chaos in the Intelsat system.
Although it is in the "national interest" to have competing satellite
systems,' 4 8 that does not mean that Comsat must rapidly and force-
fully advocate competing systems in the "consultations" before In-
telsat. Comsat's behavior in this case was consistent with both its
duties as a representative to Intelsat and the Sherman Antitrust Act,
and therefore, Comsat should be exempt from antitrust liability in its
capacity as Intelsat representative.
CHRISTINE E. BUTLER
147 47 U.S.C. § 701(a).
148 This issue was addressed in the proposed International Telecommunications Com-
petition Act of 1985. See International Telecommunications Competition Act of 1985, 131
CONG. REC. E505-02 (1985).
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